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cognitive systems dedicated to social learning begin emerging in early 
infancy (for a review, see Carey, 2009) and that social learning is more 
highly developed in humans than in any other species (Byrne, 1995; 
Tomasello et al., 2005). Although an incipient form of this strategy – 
obtaining access to food resources by exploiting the expertise of con-
specifics – is seen in some non-human primates (Stammbach, 1988; 
Russon, 1997), humans are unmatched in their highly elaborated 
ability to access the expertise of conspecifics in order to predict and 
manipulate both the physical and social environment.
Intergenerational information transfer raises the question: in 
what format(s) is this information transmitted? Humans are distin-
guished by two highly developed social learning complexes: trans-
mission of physical skills (e.g., knapping stone, making fire) via 
demonstration and imitation, and transmission of factual knowledge 
via language (Gibson, 1999). Our highly elaborated ability to share 
knowledge gives us access to a much greater range of resources than 
our ape cousins, and enables us to surmount hazardous terrain and 
vast distances in pursuit of them (Gibson, 1999). Information shar-
ing also “reduces uncertainty and increases efficiency by reducing 
search costs in hunting” (Hames, 1990, p. 93; see also Heffley, 1981). 
Specifically, information sharing increases foragers’ “sample size of 
resource distributions and characteristics” and provides “informa-
tion on prey and patches that the foragers have never exploited” by 
allowing access to information that “covers long time spans and the 
“The cognitive ability to represent situations removed from the 
immediate sensory field is… basic to the social hunting and gather-
ing adaptation. In particular, the capacity to recreate situations for 
others and to convey to them what has been found to be of interest 
and of value has been of great adaptive worth” (Biesele, 1993, p. 42).
IntroductIon
Occupation of the foraging niche requires considerable stamina, 
strength, coordination, skill, and – significantly – knowledge, which 
require a long time to acquire (Kaplan et al., 2000, 2007; Gurven 
et al., 2006). This costly period of development is supported by 
intensive parental (Lancaster and Lancaster, 1983) and alloparental 
(Hrdy, 2005, 2009) investment. Although human life history theory 
commonly characterizes this investment in terms of food resources 
and care (Lancaster and Lancaster, 1983; Kaplan et al., 2000, 2007), 
ethnographic research on the transmission of foraging skills suggests 
that the flow of resources from old-to-young includes information 
as well. Although certain skills are acquired and/or refined through 
play (Bruner et al., 1976; Boulton and Smith, 1992; Steen and Owens, 
2001; Bock, 2002; Pellegrini and Bjorkland, 2004; Göncü and Gaskins, 
2007; Pellegrini, 2011), ethnographic evidence suggests that chil-
dren acquire much of their knowledge from their parents (Hewlett 
and Cavalli-Sforza, 1986; Ohmagari and Berkes, 1997; Shennan and 
Steele, 1999). This research is paralleled by extensive evidence that 
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experiences of hundreds of individuals” as well as “[e]xtremely rare 
events unlikely ever to be experienced by a single forager” (Kaplan 
and Hill, 1992, p. 196). One way that foragers share information is 
by “telling the hunt” (Blurton Jones and Konner, 1976) – that is, by 
recounting and listening to others recount their hunting experi-
ences. Among the Ache, for example, “each man usually reports 
to the others in considerable detail concerning every game item 
that he encountered that day, and the outcome of the encounter” 
(Kaplan and Hill, 1992, p. 196; see also Leacock, 1954, p. 14; Laughlin, 
1968, p. 308; Nelson, 1969, p. 374; Biesele, 1978, p. 940; Ridington, 
1988, p. 47). Although hunting stories are ostensibly exchanged 
among adults, children certainly overhear them. As Kaplan and Hill 
(1992) note, an important source of foraging information is older 
individuals, and most Ache “children have detailed knowledge of 
resource characteristics and capture techniques before ever forag-
ing themselves” (196). Although genetic relationships between the 
storyteller and audience members are rarely specified, storytelling in 
small-scale societies appears to be characterized by a vertical trans-
mission pattern, with elders telling stories to an audience of adults 
and children (Lowie, 1918; Opler, 1940; McIlwraith, 1948; Jacobs 
and Jacobs, 1959; Biesele, 1976; Tonkinson, 1978; Ridington, 1988; 
Sobel and Bettles, 2000). Occasionally, a general pattern of story 
transmission is identified: for example, in Jicarilla culture, “Those 
who ‘give’ the stories to the children stand usually in a grandparental 
relationship to them” (Opler, 1938, p. xii). Although these observa-
tions are anecdotal, a general pattern of old-to-young transmission 
in an extended family setting can be discerned, which is in alignment 
with the proposal that parents and alloparents invest knowledge as 
well as food and care in offspring.
The costs of acquiring information at first hand can be con-
siderable (Kaplan and Hill, 1992), and investment of information 
in offspring is but one way of defraying these costs. Information 
may be shared with collateral kin, thereby enhancing the donor’s 
inclusive fitness (Scalise Sugiyama, 2005; see also Sibly, 1999). 
Information may be also be bartered in social exchanges: recipi-
ents might be motivated to reciprocate in the future, saving the 
donor future information acquisition costs (Kaplan and Hill, 
1992; Scalise Sugiyama, 2005). Ya˛nomamö peccary hunting illus-
trates this point:
If a hunter encounters a herd, he never pursues it alone. Instead, he 
returns to the village, notifies all hunters of the herd’s location and 
general direction of movement, and a group hunt is immediately 
organized. If a lone hunter returned with a white-lipped peccary 
he would be treated very sternly by the other hunters in the village 
because he would have driven the herd off and prevented other 
hunters from sharing in this superabundant resource. Hunters are 
required to forego their short-term success and share such infor-
mation. This reduces search costs for all hunters, thus enhancing 
everyone’s hunting efficiency. Over the long-term, the efficiency of 
the hunter who provides the information is enhanced because he is 
assured that if someone else encounters a herd he will be notified. 
(Hames, 1990, p. 93)
Gossip networks are another example of reciprocal information 
sharing: the price of inclusion is willingness to share gossip with 
fellow members (Bott, 1971; Capp, 2003). The use of gossip to 
manage one’s own reputation and manipulate the reputations of 
others (Emler, 2001) illustrates another potential benefit of infor-
mation sharing: influencing the beliefs and behavior of conspecifics 
in ways that serve the transmitter’s interests (Scalise Sugiyama, 
1996). Finally, visiting other groups for the purpose of acquir-
ing information may provide access to potential mates (Steward, 
1938; Kaplan and Hill, 1992; MacDonald and Hewlett, 1999). The 
proposition that parents invest knowledge in offspring is presented 
not as an alternative but as a complement to these hypotheses. 
The claim is not that humans only share information with off-
spring but that, given the value of information and the potentially 
high cost of acquiring it at first hand, one would expect parental 
investment to include knowledge as well as food and protection, 
and that storytelling is an important means of parent-to-offspring 
knowledge transfer.
This argument assumes that storytelling is an ancient part of H. 
sapiens life. For the same reason that the finely crafted parietal and 
portable art of Upper Paleolithic Europe is not evidence of a sud-
den change in human cognitive capacities (McBrearty and Brooks, 
2000; Sterelny, 2011), narrative is unlikely to be a recent develop-
ment. The earliest hard evidence of non-verbal symbolic behavior 
(shell beads and engraved ochre artifacts found in Blombos Cave, 
South Africa) dates to 75 kya (Henshilwood et al., 2002; d’Errico 
et al., 2005), but several lines of evidence indicate that the capacities 
requisite to these behaviors were in place approximately 300 kya 
(McBrearty and Brooks, 2000). Similarly, storytelling is dependent 
on cognitive capacities – e.g., shared attention, theory of mind, 
episodic memory – that evolved prior to the H. sapiens diaspora. 
Consider the inherent verbal nature of story transmission: because 
non-verbal media are highly inefficient and imprecise narrative 
devices (Scalise Sugiyama, 2005), storytelling requires language, 
which almost certainly evolved before our species migrated out of 
Africa 100 kya (Falk, 1984; Pinker, 1994; Dunbar, 1996; Holloway, 
1996; Locke and Bogin, 2006). Thus, it is likely that human forag-
ers living tens of thousands of years ago were as capable of telling 
stories as modern foragers. The tales of our ancestors are lost to us, 
but the oral traditions of historically documented foraging peo-
ples offer a window on our storied past. Although these peoples 
are not facsimiles of ancestral humans, their lifeway is similar in 
that they depend largely on foraging for their subsistence, live in 
small natural-fertility populations, and lack telecommunication, 
motorized transport, and western medicine (Marlowe, 2005). The 
thematic similarities between modern forager oral traditions indi-
cate that we would see a similar overlap in content between modern 
and ancient forager oral traditions.
This paper reviews several lines of evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that parental investment includes knowledge and 
that, in forager societies, storytelling is an important means of 
parent-to-offspring knowledge transfer. Part 2 reviews evidence 
that acquisition of foraging knowledge takes many years and that 
this knowledge is transmitted primarily from parent to child. Part 
3 reviews evidence that the human mind contains adaptations 
specific to social learning, and discusses the developmental trajec-
tory of these structures in relation to prolonged juvenility. Part 4 
reviews cross-cultural patterns in forager folklore content vis-à-vis 
key information demands of the foraging niche, and Part 5 suggests 
possible tests of the proposed hypothesis.
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(Hawkes et al., 1997, 1998; Hrdy, 1999, 2005, 2009) – investment. 
This investment is often characterized in terms of food resources 
and care (e.g., Lancaster and Lancaster, 1983; Kaplan et al., 2000, 
2007). However, both theory and evidence suggest that informa-
tion transfer is an important component of parental investment. 
All else equal, individuals who effectively communicated accurate 
information to close kin would have increased the representation of 
their genes in subsequent generations. The potential fitness payoffs 
of sharing information with immature offspring would have been 
especially large because, due to their small size and inexperience, 
juveniles are more vulnerable to environmental hazards. For exam-
ple, “even though a 4-year-old Shuar child might not be able to fend 
off an attacking anaconda in a direct encounter, knowledge that 
anacondas tend to hunt near riverbanks could have major fitness 
benefits for the child” (Barrett, 2005, p. 442). Proactive provision-
ing of reliable information would have increased offspring survival 
rates and, hence, parental fitness (Fitch, 2004). As Locke and Bogin 
(2006) note, “Even a small amount of vocal–verbal behavior would 
have facilitated warnings and instruction” (274), a claim supported 
by evidence that the mind contains mechanisms specialized for 
reasoning about precautions (Fiddick et al., 2000). As language 
increased in complexity, it exponentially increased the information 
sharing capacities of humans; however, it also added a new set of 
selection pressures. By providing an additional means of acquiring 
economic and social knowledge, language imposed a new learning 
requirement on ancestral humans: mastery of “skills associated with 
the social, pragmatic, and performative uses of language” – not only 
for the purposes of warning and instruction, but also for “deceiving, 
mollifying, negotiating, and persuading” (Locke and Bogin, 2006, 
pp. 264–265). In oral cultures, these ends are achieved through the 
use of such forms as gossip, public speaking, and – significantly – 
narrative (Scalise Sugiyama, 1996; Locke and Bogin, 2006).
Ethnographic research on the transmission of foraging skills 
supports the hypothesis that that the flow of resources from parents 
to children includes information. In a now classic study, Hewlett 
and Cavalli-Sforza (1986) asked 72 Aka adults, adolescents, and 
children whether they had each of 50 daily life skills (e.g., shelter 
construction, net hunting, food gathering, food preparation, infant 
care, sharing). For each skill, informants were asked if there were any 
person(s) who had shown them how to perform that skill. Of the 40 
adults in the sample, for all skills lumped together, the proportion of 
individuals who reported being self-taught was 0.9%. Significantly, 
parents were the primary teachers: for all traits combined, 80.7% 
of adults reported learning from a parent. Percentages were even 
higher for key foraging skills: food gathering (89.3%); net hunting 
(84.5%); sharing (83.9%); infant care (85.6%). A similar study of 
indigenous knowledge and bush skills asked James Bay Cree women 
in the villages of Moose Factory and Peawanuck whether they had 
a given skill, who their major teacher was, and how old they were 
when they learned the skill. Parents were by far the most frequent 
source of knowledge: 61% of Moose Factory participants and 72% 
of Peawanuck participants named one or both parents as their main 
teachers (Ohmagari and Berkes, 1997). Although their study of the 
transmission of traditional food procurement techniques examined 
peasants, Ruddle and Chesterfield (1977) also found that parents 
were the primary teachers. Shennan and Steele (1999) expressly 
argue that skill transmission is a form of parental investment. In a 
What do Forager chIldren need to learn, and hoW 
long does It take to learn It?
Humans are characterized by a long lifespan, large brain relative 
to body size, and long period of juvenile dependency. The evolu-
tion of these traits is the subject of vigorous debate, centered on 
the question of whether learning is a consequence or a cause of 
prolonged juvenility (Bock and Sellen, 2002; Hrdy, 2005; Konner, 
2010). The former view sees prolonged juvenility as the by-product 
of selection for larger body size: the benefits of larger body size out-
weigh the costs of the longer growing period they require (Charnov, 
1993; Charnov and Berrigan, 1993). A complementary view, the 
grandmother hypothesis, posits that the evolution of longevity was 
driven by the provisioning of descendants by post-reproductive 
women (Hawkes et al., 1989, 1997, 1998; O’Connell et al., 1999). 
The latter view, formulated by Kaplan and colleagues as the embod-
ied capital hypothesis, posits that our long lifespan and large brain 
co-evolved through the exploitation of nutrient-dense resources 
using complex extraction techniques, the acquisition of which 
requires a long growth and learning period supported by inten-
sive parental investment (Lancaster and Lancaster, 1983; Bogin, 
1997, 1999; Kaplan et al., 2000, 2007). On this view, the costs of 
investment in growth and development early in the lifespan are 
offset by the benefits they yield later in the lifespan. In functional 
terms, embodied capital includes a range of physical and mental 
attributes, including strength, speed, stamina, immune function, 
skill, and knowledge. A related argument, the social intelligence 
hypothesis, posits that encephalization was driven by the demands of 
predicting and manipulating the behavior of conspecifics, necessi-
tating an extended juvenile period for the development of complex 
social skills and the cognitive capacities that scaffold them (Byrne 
and Whiten, 1988; Dunbar, 1992, 1996, 2007; Whiten and Byrne, 
1997; Flinn et al., 2005). The chief bone of contention between the 
latter two hypotheses is whether the selection pressures driving 
encephalization were social or ecological. However, this argument 
dissipates in light of the role that sharing and cooperation play 
in hunter-gatherer life (Reader and Laland, 2002; Kaplan et al., 
2007; MacDonald, 2007a,b). Humans are social foragers: many of 
the resource-extraction and foraging-risk-management strategies 
deployed by foragers rely heavily on intraspecific cooperation (e.g., 
Tonkinson, 1978; Wiessner, 1982; Berkes et al., 1994), including 
social learning (Buckley and Steele, 2002; MacDonald, 2007a,b). 
Cooperative hunting and/or fishing, for example, are practiced 
across a wide range of cultures (Downs, 1966; Nelson, 1969; Lee, 
1979; Hill and Hawkes, 1983; Yost and Kelley, 1983; Hewlett, 1991; 
Chagnon, 1997; Sugiyama and Chacon, 2000; Brody, 2002), and 
successful implementation of such strategies can depend on infor-
mation sharing (e.g., Heffley, 1981; Hames, 1990). Thus, the exploi-
tation of difficult-to-acquire resources – and concomitant tasks 
such as social exchange, mate acquisition, and child care – require 
complex manipulations of both the physical and social environ-
ment (Locke and Bogin, 2006).
Although different researchers emphasize different areas of 
growth, there is widespread agreement that successful occupation of 
the foraging niche requires a high degree of strength, coordination, 
skill, and/or knowledge; that these attributes require a significant 
period of time to acquire; and that this costly period of development 
is supported by intensive parental – and, some argue, alloparental 
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conditions” (Downs, 1966). Among the !Kung, “knowledge of plant 
identification, growth, ripeness, and location… is extremely com-
plex” and “!Kung women are highly skilled at distinguishing useful 
from non-useful or dangerous plants and at finding and bring-
ing home sufficient quantities of the best food species available” 
(Lee, 1984, p. 37). The use of food storage to survive predictable 
annual shortfalls creates additional information demands, such as 
“boning, drying, salting, and smoking as well as the use of special-
ized tools” (Kramer, 2005b, p. 227). Hunting and gathering also 
require extensive topographical and wayfinding knowledge: many 
foraging groups utilize more than 1000 km2 in the course of a year 
(Kelly, 1995, pp. 112–115). The James Bay Cree are a case in point: 
“a knowledge of fish distributions and behavior, as well as the 
ability to navigate the coast are prerequisites to successful fishing” 
(Ohmagari and Berkes, 1997, p. 200, emphasis added). Indeed, 
traditional Cree and Inuit knowledge of seasonal cycles, rivers, 
currents, sea ice, and the food web is so extensive that it has been 
used to aid in assessments of sustainable resource development 
in the Hudson Bay region (McDonald et al., 1997).
Perhaps the most impressive display of forager knowledge is 
seen in tracking. From the angle at which urine has landed on 
snow, a Beaver hunter can tell whether the moose he is stalking 
is a cow or a bull; from the distances between hoof marks, he 
can infer the animal’s speed; and from the texture and shape of 
a hoof mark or droppings, he can tell how long ago an animal 
passed through an area (Brody, 2002).!Xo trackers were able to 
tell that “the spoor leaving the sleeping place had been made early 
that morning and was therefore relatively fresh. The spoor then 
followed a straight course, indicating that the animal was on its 
way to a specific destination” (Liebenberg, 1990, p. 80). When 
they came upon several sets of footprints all in the same area, one 
tracker determined “that these footprints all belonged to the same 
animal, but were made during the previous days. He explained 
that the particular area was the feeding ground of that particular 
wildebeest. Since it was, by that time, about midday, it could be 
expected that the wildebeest may be resting in the shade in the 
near vicinity” (Liebenberg, 1990, p. 80).
Ethnographic evidence suggests that forager education begins 
early. As noted above, Mer children begin spearfishing as toddlers 
(Bliege Bird and Bird, 2002) and Waorani boys are using blowguns 
by age 5 (Yost and Kelley, 1983). Similarly, Hadza boys are given 
their first bows at age 3 (Marlowe, 2010). Cree children began learn-
ing as soon as they could walk and started helping with work around 
camp (Long, 1978). Mardudjara children began accumulating for-
aging knowledge at very early age (Tonkinson, 1978), and most 
Ache “children have detailed knowledge of resource characteristics 
and capture techniques before ever foraging themselves” (Kaplan 
and Hill, 1992, p. 196). Chagnon (1997) observes that Yanomamö 
children are “accomplished naturalists” (130) at an early age – for 
example, that most 12-year-old boys can name 20 species of bees, 
give anatomical or behavioral reasons for their distinctions, and 
tell which ones produce the best honey. Similarly, “any 12-year-old 
[!Kung] boy can accurately reproduce in the sand the prints of a 
dozen species” (Lee, 1984, p. 47). However, an incident reported 
by Helena Valero (a Brazilian woman who was captured by the 
Ya˛nomamö) suggests that, although children’s foraging knowledge 
may be considerable, it is not exhaustive. During Valero’s captivity, 
survey of over a dozen cultures of varying complexity, they found 
that transmission of craft skills was most often from parent to 
child. There are some noteworthy exceptions to this rule: among 
the Hadza, for example, boys “almost never go hunting with their 
fathers” (Marlowe, 2010, p. 157), learning instead through a com-
bination of practice and observation of older boys.
Several lines of evidence suggest that foraging knowledge takes 
considerable time to acquire and refine. Hewlett and Cavalli-
Sforza (1986) found that, by age 10, the majority of Aka children 
have acquired most of the skills they need to survive in the forest. 
However, certain key skills are not mastered until the mid-teens. At 
age 10, 13% of girls and 0.0% of boys report having mating skills, 
whereas at age 15, 100% of girls and 94% of boys report having 
these skills. At age 10, 69% of girls and 36% of boys report hav-
ing infant care skills, whereas at age 15, 84% of girls and 70% of 
boys report having these skills. During this same period, boys also 
increase their net hunting and other hunting skills: at age 10, 75% 
have net hunting and 28% have other hunting skills, while at age 
15, 96% have net hunting and 63% have other hunting skills. This 
latter finding is important given our species’ dietary dependence on 
nutrient-dense foods to support the high metabolic cost of brain 
growth and maintenance (Leonard et al., 2007), and the importance 
of hunting in obtaining these foods. Other studies report similar 
ages for indigenous skill acquisition. For example, among the James 
Bay Cree, the mean age of transmission was 14 in Moose factory and 
11 in Peawanuck; older Cree women reported that they had learned 
the same skills by the age of 13–15, and had mastered all bush 
skills before the age of marriage (Ohmagari and Berkes, 1997, pp. 
209–210). These findings are consistent with ethnographic research 
indicating that Cree children had the skills requisite to surviving in 
the bush by the time they reached their mid-to-late teens (Rogers 
and Rogers, 1960; Flannery, 1962; Blythe et al., 1985). Ruddle and 
Chesterfield (1977, p. 104) report similar findings for Venezuelan 
peasants. Observations of single-skill acquisition, too, suggest that 
mastery takes years of practice. For example, Mer children begin 
spearfishing as soon as they begin walking, yet it is not until between 
the ages of 10 and 14 that those “children that choose to invest in 
spearfishing practice reach the same efficiency as the most practiced 
adult” (Bliege Bird and Bird, 2002, p. 262). Waorani boys can con-
sistently hit leaf and fruit targets with a blowgun at age 5, but do 
not become proficient until their late teens (Yost and Kelley, 1983).
The embodied capital hypothesis is supported by comparative 
evidence that primate foraging is cognitively demanding (Menzel, 
1997) and ethnographic evidence that successful exploitation of 
the foraging niche requires extensive zoological, botanical, and 
geographical knowledge (Laughlin, 1968; Blurton Jones and 
Konner, 1976). For example, the Aka exploit 63 plant species, 20 
insect species, honey from 8 species of bees, and 28 species of 
game, the latter of which requires knowledge of several capture 
techniques (e.g., spear, net, crossbow, snare, trap; Hewlett, 1991). 
Similarly, the Ache utilize a minimum of 78 mammal species, 21 
reptile and amphibian species, 150 bird species, and 14 fish spe-
cies (Kaplan et al., 2000, p. 171). Like hunting, gathering requires 
extensive knowledge. Among the Washo, for example, efficient 
gathering “requires a vast fund of knowledge about the growth 
cycle of dozens of plant species, [and] an understanding of the 
effect of weather on growth and knowledge of soils and growing 
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girls don’t begin gathering until age 14 suggests that they continue 
to live with their parents after marriage because their foraging 
knowledge is incomplete.
In contrast to the Kalahari, the Hadza environment has ample 
shade, salient landmarks, panoramic vistas, and sufficient dry 
season water sources. These features greatly reduce the danger 
of heat exhaustion and the chances of getting lost. Accordingly, 
Hadza children are allowed to play and forage on their own, and 
may spend several hours a day away from camp (Blurton Jones 
et al., 1994). Similarly, Martu children begin foraging on their own 
without parental supervision at a very young age (Bird and Bliege 
Bird, 2005). Bird and Bliege Bird found that the winyjikity goanna 
return rates for younger (age 5–7) Martu children were not sig-
nificantly different from those of older (age 12–14) children, and 
conclude that, “Beyond about 5 years, age alone has little effect on 
children’s hunting success in rocky outcrops” (142). Although this 
research appears to indicate that foraging competence is swiftly 
achieved, the range of skills examined in these studies is quite 
narrow. For example, Bird and Bliege Bird (2005) only exam-
ined the harvesting of one wild resource (i.e., hunting winyjikity 
goannas) in one location (rocky outcrops). The exploitation of 
other resources and ecological zones may require a much longer 
learning period. Also, participants drove to field camps and in 
some cases to foraging locations, which removed the route selec-
tion and navigation tasks normally associated with hunting and 
gathering. Topographical information – e.g., the distribution of 
resources across the landscape, their season(s) of availability, their 
location relative to travel routes – is unlikely to be acquired by 
hunting in rocky outcrops close to camp, or to be mastered by age 
5. Aboriginal children are able to capture small game and gather 
grubs and fruit, but they remain dependent on their parents for 
foods with higher capture and processing costs (Gould, 1980). A 
Martu woman’s memories of her childhood foraging experiences 
illustrates this point:
Mothers and fathers gone out hunting and leave us kids in camp. 
When we got hungry we go hunting for little lizard, get him and cook 
it and eat him up. Me little bit big now, I go hunting myself, tracking 
goanna and kill him…. Soon as mother leave him, little ones go hunt-
ing, kill animals, blue tongue, mountain devil, take them home before 
mother and father come back, cook and eat it. Mother come back and 
feed all them kids…. Morning again, father one he go hunting…. He 
been get and kill an emu, bring and cook him. Everyone happy, they 
bin say he good hunter. (Napanangka, 1995, p. 143)
As Konner (2010) astutely observes, the informant’s references to 
mother feeding all the kids and father being a good hunter “show 
that the children did not really fend for themselves” (645). In sum, 
in low-risk environments with abundant easy-to-harvest foods, 
children may make considerable contributions to their subsistence 
(Bliege Bird and Bird, 2002; Kramer, 2002, 2005a,b; Tucker and 
Young, 2005). However, children’s foraging return rates for single 
or a small subset of resources are not a proxy for breadth and depth 
of foraging knowledge.
Turning this observation on its head, Tucker and Young 
(2005) argue that children’s contributions to their caloric 
intake are not an accurate measure of their maximum  foraging 
a little girl died and another became ill from eating the eggs of a 
poisonous toad. An older woman scolded the sick girl: “So you don’t 
know that the eggs of that toad are poisonous? When I was with the 
Namoeteri five children died after eating the eggs of that toad…. 
We had gone to pick mumu, and the children, who stayed behind 
with only the old women, had cooked the toad’s eggs” (Biocca, 
1970, p. 86). Unfortunately, these observations are anecdotal and 
therefore inconclusive. Because there are so few systematic studies 
of forager knowledge transmission, it is not clear how or when 
children master this body of knowledge.
In some habitats, the age at which children begin acquiring for-
aging skills is limited by local ecology. Some skills can’t be taught 
until the child has sufficient stamina to travel long distances, suf-
ficient patience to endure discomfort, and/or sufficient strength to 
manage heavy loads or animals. For example, although acquisition 
of foraging knowledge began in early childhood, Mardudjara men 
did not take their sons hunting with them until they were mature 
enough to travel long distances and endure the tension of stalking 
game without detection (Tonkinson, 1978). One Dunne-za inform-
ant reports that kids start to go on hunts “After they’re about the 
same size Joe, you know [age 10]. Just enough to think, you know. To 
talk, and think. Walk” (Ridington, 1988, p. 170). Netsilingmiut boys 
did not begin to learn breathing-hole seal hunting until between 
the ages of 12 and 14 (Rasmussen, 1931), presumably because of 
the strength required to haul in a seal and the endurance required 
to lie still on the ice in frigid temperatures for hours at a time. In 
some environments, foraging is simply too dangerous and/or dif-
ficult for young children, which constrains their opportunities for 
acquiring certain skills until they are older.
Blurton Jones et al.’s (1994) comparison of !Kung and Hadza 
children’s foraging illustrates this point. The Kalahari Desert is 
characterized by high temperatures, little water, predators, and 
thorny plants. Hunting and gathering excursions may take adults 
far from camp, and the days are hot 8 months out of the year. Due 
to the flat featureless terrain and thick brush, a child who falls 
behind or wanders off is likely to get lost, which is very dangerous: 
children are much more vulnerable to heat exhaustion, cold, star-
vation, and predation than adults. Not surprisingly, !Kung parents 
regard children as a hindrance to hunting and gathering. Children 
over age 3 rarely accompany women on gathering forays: a woman 
can’t carry an older child who gets tired, because she is usually car-
rying an infant or toddler, in addition to whatever she has gathered. 
These problems are exacerbated in the dry season, when there are 
no water sources en route to gathering sites. Although there is no 
direct research on !Kung children’s mastery of foraging skills, chil-
dren’s contribution to subsistence gives some indication of when 
this occurs. According to Draper (1976),/Du/da !Kung children 
make virtually no economic contribution to subsistence: boys do 
not begin serious hunting until age 16 or older, and girls do not 
begin regular food, water, and wood gathering until around age 
14 (see also Draper and Cashdan, 1988). !Kung marriage practices 
suggest that gathering skills are not mastered for several years. 
Traditionally, !Kung girls were married between the age of 12 and 
16 but, due to the practice of bride service, effectively remained 
at home until they were older. One reason the !Kung give for the 
practice of bride service is that “a girl of 12 or 14 was simply too 
young to leave her parents” (Lee, 1984). The fact that/Du/da !Kung 
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authors only followed children during the dry season; there may be 
seasonal variation in Hadza boys’ hunting and in Hadza children’s 
gathering returns in general.
Although researchers disagree over whether the comparatively 
low productivity of forager children is due to insufficient size/
strength or insufficient knowledge, research indicates that both fac-
tors are involved. Both within and across habitats, economic tasks 
vary in the degree of strength, skill and knowledge they demand. 
This variation may be parsed in terms of easy-to-harvest collected 
resources (e.g., fallen fruit) versus difficult-to-harvest extracted 
resources (e.g., large game; Kaplan et al., 2000). In studies that 
find high foraging return rates for children, the targeted resource(s) 
tends to fall into the former category (e.g., Hawkes et al., 1995; 
Bliege Bird and Bird, 2002; Bird and Bliege Bird, 2005; Tucker and 
Young, 2005). Moreover, as noted above, these high rates tend to 
occur either in exceptionally safe, easily navigable habitats (e.g., 
Blurton Jones et al., 1994; Bliege Bird and Bird, 2002; Bird and 
Bliege Bird, 2005; Tucker and Young, 2005) or when children forage 
in the company of adults (Hawkes et al., 1995) – conditions that 
spare children the tasks of remembering resource locations, route 
finding, and/or avoiding environmental hazards, and thus belie the 
“ease” with which these resources are harvested.
More importantly, humans do not live by collected resources 
alone. Harvesting extracted resources typically involves a suite 
of skills, some of which may be acquired relatively quickly (e.g., 
marksmanship), and others of which may take years to master 
(e.g., locating and successfully capturing game; Blurton Jones 
and Marlowe, 2002; Walker et al., 2002; Gurven et al., 2006). As 
Bock (2002) argues, for any given task, two aspects of technology 
potentially come into play: the strength needed to effect it and the 
knowledge and/or skill needed to deploy it. For example, picking 
up nuts may seem simple, but carrying them takes strength and 
finding them takes knowledge. A !Kung woman may walk 16 km 
per day carrying a full day’s harvest and a child. She needs to know 
where foods are to be found, and in what season they are edible; 
how to keep oriented in the bush (5- and 6-year-old !Kung children 
cannot do this; Blurton Jones et al., 1994); and how to read animal 
tracks. The latter skill is integral to avoiding dangerous animals 
(e.g., lions, leopards, elephants, snakes) while gathering. On this 
point, !Kung women are able to tell whether a given snake species 
is dangerous or not, and how it reacts to the presence of humans. 
While gathering, !Kung women also make note of animal tracks 
and report recent game movements to the men when they return to 
camp. Once gathered, foods may require processing, which may take 
both strength and skill. For example, although a certain amount 
of strength and coordination are needed to crack mongongo nuts 
effectively, peak efficiency takes “some years to acquire after adults 
stop growing” (Bock, 2002), suggesting that knowledge affects effi-
ciency. Thus, gathering nuts is not a simple matter of being able 
to carry a heavy load.
Bock’s (2005) study of fishing among San and Bantu boys and 
girls in the Okavango Delta illustrates this point by teasing out 
the relationships between size, experience, and children’s foraging 
returns. His findings support the claim that childhood is a period 
of both strength and knowledge acquisition. He found that, for 
girls’ basket fishing, arm strength does not significantly affect the 
quantity of fish caught. Variation in fishing returns is due to age 
potential, which makes it difficult to pinpoint the terminus 
of juvenile dependency. This point is made in the context of 
Mikea children’s specialization in a high-quality, easily extracted 
resource: the ovy tuber. Tucker and Young suggest that Mikea 
children could provide most of their caloric needs, but choose 
not to. However, the Mikea forest is an exceptionally safe for-
aging habitat for children; thus, Mikea children do not face 
the information demands associated with avoiding dangerous 
animals, exposure, heat exhaustion, and other environmental 
hazards. Moreover, although ovy is “the most important for-
aged food source” (Tucker and Young, 2005, p. 152), the authors 
identify at least 23 other wild foods included in the Mikea diet, 
begging the question of when Mikea children master the skills 
needed to harvest them. High foraging return rates (measured 
in calories) have been documented among Hadza children as 
well. However, most of these calories are acquired on trips to 
distant berry patches with adults (Hawkes et al., 1995, p. 694); 
thus, these children are largely spared the tasks of route finding, 
predator detection, and remembering patch location(s).
Bird and Bliege Bird (2005) add another turn of the screw by 
noting that, because it is an indirect measure, foraging efficiency 
does not tell us exactly how long it takes children to acquire a given 
foraging skill. While true, this observation misses the larger point 
that successful exploitation of the foraging niche requires a “basket 
of competencies” (Bock, 2002, p. 168) that are interdependent and 
additive. A given competence may be mastered early and/or quickly, 
but its successful deployment may require recruitment of other 
competencies that do not come online or are not mastered until 
later in life. As Blurton Jones and Marlowe (2002) note, “The dif-
ference between being a good archer and being a successful hunter 
may be very large; hunting benefits from extensive knowledge and 
requires several skills” (229).
Measuring children’s contributions to their subsistence in calo-
ries is also problematic in that it does not indicate whether chil-
dren’s foraging returns meet their nutritional needs. For example, 
Hadza children’s mean in-patch acquisition rates for two types 
of berries (tafabe and ondishibe) are 2223 and 964 cal/h, respec-
tively – about 50–70% of adult rates (Hawkes et al., 1995). Based 
on this finding, the authors argue that Hadza children “could earn 
their own daily consumption requirements in less than 3 h once 
they reached the patch” (693). However, no amount of berries will 
provide sufficient fat or protein for a growing child, nor is it likely 
to provide all necessary vitamins and minerals. Another Hadza 
study estimates that, “If children spent just 2 h per day foraging 
for baobab, or (for older boys with access to an axe) honey, they 
would acquire around 800–1000 cal, almost half the calories they 
need…. Thus it is quite possible that Hadza children from the 
age of about 5 years old provide half of their food by their own 
efforts” (Blurton Jones et al., 1989, p. 380). While high foraging 
return rates among dependent children may contribute to shorter 
inter-birth intervals for mothers, a child who provides half of his/
her daily calories is by no means economically independent, and a 
diet of baobab and/or honey cannot supply the fatty acids requisite 
to brain growth at this stage of life (Leonard et al., 2007). On this 
point, the authors observe that Hadza boys age 10 and older can 
and do shoot birds and small animals, “but this was not a significant 
part of their diet” (Blurton Jones et al., 1989, p. 379). However, the 
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 encephalization are tandem processes, each driving the other in a 
2-million-year-long feedback loop. In the course of this process, 
some parts of the brain were enlarged more than others. These areas 
include the cerebellum, neocortex, basal ganglia, and hippocampus 
(Stephan et al., 1981), all of which are integral to learning processes. 
Thus, it appears that brain expansion was driven, at least in part, by 
selection for increased learning capacities. This hypothesis is sup-
ported by extensive research in developmental psychology showing 
early onset of a host of domain-specific cognitive systems that guide 
attention to relevant stimuli and organize informational inputs (for 
a review, see Carey, 2009).
A sizeable portion of this cognitive equipage appears to be dedi-
cated to mechanisms for social learning: to a greater degree than 
other species, humans appear to be designed to acquire information 
from conspecifics (Byrne, 1995; Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et al., 
2005). Perhaps the most compelling evidence in support of this 
claim is shared attention, which appears to be unique to humans 
(Baron-Cohen, 2005) and emerges predictably near the end of the 
first year (Scaife and Bruner, 1975; Butterworth and Cochran, 1980; 
Leslie, 1994; Baron-Cohen, 1995, 2005; Carpenter et al., 1998b) – 
well before infants have mastered the art of walking. This is what 
we would expect if social learning were integral to occupation of 
the foraging niche and if learning took a long time. If humans 
could quickly accumulate all knowledge requisite to success in their 
ecological niche, there would be no need for the structures that 
subserve learning to develop early.
In addition to shared attention, learning from others requires 
shared intentionality: the ability to attribute a goal to an individual, 
to understand how the individual’s actions subserve his/her goal, 
and to make the extrapolation, “When I have the same goal I can 
use the same means” (Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 680). This capacity 
emerges by about 14 months, and is neatly illustrated in Meltzoff ’s 
(1995) study of imitation in 18-month-old infants. Subjects were 
presented with two types of demonstrations. In the first condition, 
infants watched an adult perform actions on objects, whereas in the 
second condition, infants watched an adult try but fail to perform 
actions on objects (e.g., try but fail to pull apart two parts of an 
object). Both groups reproduced the target actions equally well. 
Tellingly, in Condition 2, infants appeared to understand what the 
adult was trying (i.e., intended) to do and performed that action 
instead of mimicking the adult’s actual behavior. In a related study, 
Carpenter et al. (1998a) examined 14- to 18-month-old infants’ 
imitation of accidental versus intentional actions. Infants watched 
as an adult performed two-action sequences on objects. One action 
was marked vocally as intentional (“There!”), and one action was 
marked as accidental (“Woops!”). Infants were then given the 
opportunity to make the result occur themselves. Infants imitated 
twice as many intentional actions as accidental ones regardless of 
the order in which they saw them. Gergely et al. (2002) report an 
even more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between 
intention and action. In this study, 14-month-old infants watched 
as an actor used his head to turn on a light in either a hands-free or 
a hands-occupied condition. When given the opportunity to turn 
on the light themselves, subjects who saw the hands-free condi-
tion used the head method more often than infants who saw the 
hands-occupied condition. These results suggest that infants in the 
hands-occupied condition assumed that the actor wouldn’t have 
(i.e., experience, knowledge) alone: older girls catch more fish. In 
contrast, arm strength, not age, is a predictor of size (mean weight) 
of fish caught: stronger girls catch bigger fish. This is because catch-
ing larger fish requires a larger basket and the strength to move the 
basket through deep water. Bock concludes that age (experience) 
is important in knowing where to find fish, whereas strength is 
integral to catching larger fish. For boys’ canoe fishing, Bock found 
that arm strength, not age, is predictor of quantity of fish caught: 
stronger boys catch more fish. This may be related to the ability to 
pole a canoe close to the reed beds, which requires poling a long 
distance through deeper water. In contrast, age, not arm strength, 
is a predictor of size (mean weight) of fish caught: older boys catch 
bigger fish. Bock concludes that stronger boys can pole a canoe 
close to the reeds, whereas more experienced boys may have greater 
knowledge of where to find big fish and/or how to use hook and line.
In sum, in order to understand why prolonged juvenility evolved 
in humans, it is critical to determine when children master the full 
spectrum of skills it takes to be a competent forager. In so doing, 
it is important to include not only subsistence skills per se (e.g., 
arrow shooting, fish jigging, tuber digging), but skills that scaffold 
foraging (e.g., wayfinding, tool manufacture, predator avoidance), 
including skills that are integral to navigating the social world (e.g., 
sharing, mating, infant care). Research indicates that, at least in 
some habitats, it takes many years to reach peak foraging efficiency 
(Ohtsuka, 1989; Kaplan et al., 2000, 2003; Kaplan and Bock, 2001; 
Bock, 2002; Walker et al., 2002; Gurven et al., 2006), and juve-
nile consumption exceeds production until the late teens or older 
(Kaplan and Robson, 2002; Robinson et al., 2008). However, as 
noted above, foraging efficiency is an indirect measure and does not 
tell us exactly how long it takes to learn these skills. With regard to 
the question of whether and to what degree parents invest knowl-
edge in their children, it would be useful to know how much for-
ager children learn on their own, and how much they learn from 
adults. Unfortunately, there is no data on these groups comparable 
to Hewlett and Cavalli-Sforza’s (1986), showing the age at which 
children master a representative sample of foraging skills and how 
they acquire them. Despite this lack, cross-cultural ethnographic 
evidence suggests that successful occupation of the foraging niche 
requires extensive knowledge, that at least some of this knowledge 
is transmitted from parents to children, and that mastery of the 
“basket of competencies” is not attained until the mid-teens – more 
or less the length of the extended juvenile period.
the role oF learnIng In the ForagIng nIche
The question at the heart of the prolonged juvenility debate is not 
whether children learn during childhood, but whether learning is 
a cause or consequence of the extended juvenile period (Bock and 
Sellen, 2002; Hrdy, 2005; Konner, 2010). Although presented as 
alternative processes, they are most likely complementary. Human 
infants are born when the brain is only 25% of its adult size, and are 
incapable of supplying the energy needed to complete the growth 
process. Moreover, neural tissue is metabolically expensive to grow 
and operate, commandeering 87% of resting metabolic rate in 
infancy and 20–25% in adulthood (Leonard et al., 2007). Thus, 
brain expansion could not have been selected for in the absence 
of either, increased provisioning/protection or compensatory 
benefits. On this view, extended provisioning of offspring and 
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et al., 2007). Thus, the mindreading system is additive, involving 
the successive assembly and integration of multiple components 
over time. This assembly is assumed to be complete when chil-
dren can understand that others can have beliefs that are different 
from theirs and that these beliefs can be false (i.e., false belief). 
However, mindreading development does not end with the ability 
to understand the behavior of others in terms of epistemic states. 
The mindreading system cannot be considered complete until it can 
be used to construct a reliable, integrated “social map of the persons, 
relationships, motives, interactions, emotions, and intentions” in 
the individual’s social environment (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992, 
p. 163). Just as a spatial map represents the relative positions of a 
given set of entities, a social map represents the motives, emotions, 
and intentions of individuals in relation to one another. In order to 
make such a map, a person must be able to (1) note and remember 
the actions performed by a specific individual; (2) determine which 
of the individual’s actions subserve which of the individual’s goals 
(i.e., infer the individual’s plans for attaining his/her goals); (3) 
integrate this representation with representations of the goals and 
actions of the other individuals in his/her social world; (4) iden-
tify points of conflict between the goals of these individuals; and 
(5) track the outcomes of these conflicts (Scalise Sugiyama, 2009). 
In short, mapping one’s social world requires the ability to track 
interactions between multiple lines of goal-directed action. The 
question of when this capacity develops is an open one.
On this point, children’s acquisition of narrative competence 
is illustrative. Story plots trace the conflicts between characters’ 
goals and the outcomes of those conflicts (Scalise Sugiyama, 2005, 
2009). Thus, narrative processing entails tracking interactions 
between multiple lines of goal-directed action – i.e., the construc-
tion of a social map of the story world. Interestingly, children’s 
early narrative is organized by a central theme rather than a plot 
(Sutton-Smith, 1986). After age 3 or 4, story focus shifts from a 
central theme to a central character, but conflict – a central goal 
and opposition to that goal – is still absent. Central characters with 
a clear conflict do not appear regularly until somewhere between 
age 5 and 7. Children “can state a conflict before they can develop 
and resolve it” and do not master the latter ability until as late as 
age 10 (Sutton-Smith, 1986, p. 82). Thus, plot structure consists 
of several components, which children appear to master in stages: 
(1) organization around a central character, (2) with a clear goal, 
and (3) obstacles to the attainment of that goal (including goals 
of other characters). Of course, children’s acquisition of narrative 
competence cannot tell us when the ability to track multiple lines 
of goal-directed action emerges, as development of this ability may 
precede development of the linguistic skills requisite to expressing 
it. However, children’s narrative development shows that mapping 
the social world requires the ability not only to attribute mental 
states to others, but to chart the mental states of multiple indi-
viduals as they converge and/or collide with one another in an 
endless series of moves and countermoves. Little is known about 
the design or ontogeny of the cognitive structures involved in this 
task. Additionally, because social environments vary across locales, 
mapping them requires local information inputs. Yup’ik girls’ sto-
ryknifing (oral narrative accompanied by drawings sketched in 
mud with a knife) suggests that storytelling may be a source of 
these inputs. Among other topics, participants “tell about the people 
used his head if his hands had been free. Conversely, infants in the 
hands-free condition appear to have assumed that the actor had a 
reason for using his head instead of his hands. These studies suggest 
that infants infer the goal of an actor, and use this representation 
to replicate that goal.
Shared intentionality is also integral to language learning 
(Tomasello et al., 2005) and thus to the acquisition of knowledge 
via linguistic communication. As Baldwin et al.’s (1996) “dawnoo” 
experiment illustrates, language acquisition is dependent on the 
ability to understand what a conspecific intends (“means”) by an 
utterance. In this study, toddlers (19–20 months) were shown a 
novel object while a speaker simultaneously produced a novel label 
(e.g., “A dawnoo!”). In the first condition, the speaker was seated 
next to the infant and looking at the novel object when the novel 
label was vocalized; in the second condition, the speaker was seated 
out of sight of the infant. Infants in the first condition readily chose 
the correct object over an equally salient distractor object when 
they were later asked to find the dawnoo. In contrast, infants in the 
second condition were just as likely to choose the distractor object 
as the correct object. Baldwin’s (1993) team concluded that toddlers 
are capable of understanding that speakers intend to talk about 
objects and of using this understanding to acquire new  information 
– in this case, to learn new object–word associations.
Pinpointing the developmental onset of the mechanisms 
involved in social learning is important because, as noted above, 
their early emergence suggests that social learning is integral to 
occupation of the foraging niche. It also suggests that assembly of 
these mechanisms – including information input – takes a lengthy 
period of time. However, this is only a supposition unless we know 
when development of these capacities is complete: to understand 
the relationship between learning and the evolution of prolonged 
childhood, we need to understand how long learning takes. Thus, 
it is critical to identify not only the age of onset of learning systems, 
but also the age of maturity. At this point, the amount of time 
required for complete assembly of these mechanisms is largely 
unknown – a lack that parallels the paucity of ethnographic data 
on the time frame for acquisition of essential knowledge sets 
among foragers.
To illustrate this point, consider three knowledge sets critical to 
success in the foraging niche: information about the social environ-
ment, animal behavior/characteristics, and topography. Acquisition 
of social information is subserved, in part, by the mindreading 
system. Research indicates that mindreading involves several dif-
ferent capacities, with different developmental trajectories (e.g., 
Leslie, 1994; Baron-Cohen, 2005). For example: the ability to 
represent affective states emerges at around 3 months (Walker, 
1982); the understanding that an entity with eyes can perceive 
emerges between birth and 9 months (Baron-Cohen, 2005); the 
ability to represent goal-directed action emerges between 5 and 
7 months (Woodward, 1998; Csibra et al., 1999; Hamlin et al., 
2007); shared attention emerges by 12 months (Scaife and Bruner, 
1975; Butterworth and Cochran, 1980; Carpenter et al., 1998b); 
and the understanding that seeing-leads-to-knowing emerges by 
15 months (O’Neill, 1996; Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005). Pretense, 
too, appears to develop in stages: pretend-play emerges between 18 
and 24 months, but the understanding of pretense (i.e., recogniz-
ing when others are engaging in it) emerges by 15 months (Onishi 
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and travel long distances through this landscape without getting 
lost? Psychological research indicates that children begin to navi-
gate by landmark around age 2, but do not use orientation (dead 
reckoning) strategies until age 8 (Anooshian and Young, 1981; 
Scholnick et al., 1990; Blades and Medlicott, 1992). Once again, 
however, we must not confuse onset with maturity. Navigating by 
landmark requires informational input (i.e., knowledge of land-
marks in one’s local environment) and, given that many forager 
groups maintain knowledge of more than 1000 km2 (Kelly, 1995, 
pp. 112–115), this information may take years to acquire. Given 
the wide range of latitudes occupied by our species, dead reckon-
ing mechanisms may similarly require local environmental inputs 
for assembly and calibration (i.e., to local and seasonal variation 
in the sun’s zenith, hours of daylight, etc.).
What do humans learn From storytellIng?
storIes as a supplement to epIsodIc memory
Narrative is a highly memorable verbal format (Sperber, 1985); as 
such, it might plausibly be used as a means of storing and trans-
mitting foraging knowledge. Due to this verbal nature, however, 
storytelling is better suited for transmitting certain kinds of infor-
mation than others. For example, the motor skills required for spear 
throwing, basket weaving, and using a fire drill are best developed 
through practice. In the ethnographic literature, it is commonly 
observed that storytelling is used to transmit cultural prescriptions 
and proscriptions. For example, the oral tradition “is of greatest 
functional importance to the Jicarilla in the guidance of his behav-
ior, his beliefs, and his ceremonies…. The mythology represents for 
him the summation of knowledge on the basis of which he must 
act” (Opler, 1940, p. x; see also Goodwin, 1939; Street, 1972; Biesele, 
1993; de Marrais et al., 1994; Scalise Sugiyama, 2008). Forager oral 
traditions also appear to serve as a repository for information rel-
evant to recurrent problems of forager existence, such as manipu-
lating and being manipulated by others (Scalise Sugiyama, 1996), 
locating and harvesting resources (Scalise Sugiyama, 2001a,b), 
famine (Sobel and Bettles, 2000; Scalise Sugiyama and Sugiyama, 
2009), predator avoidance (Scalise Sugiyama, 2004, 2006), free 
riding (Scalise Sugiyama, 2008), wayfinding (Scalise Sugiyama 
and Sugiyama, 2008), and errant children (Scalise Sugiyama and 
Sugiyama, in press). Research on mental time travel – the ability 
to recall the past and imagine the future – provides a framework 
for integrating all of these claims.
Schacter et al. (2007) argue that our ability to plan (i.e., imagine 
future scenarios) is rooted in episodic memory (recall of personal 
experience). Noting that event simulation is useful for planning 
for the future, they argue that the function of episodic memory is 
to generate simulations of possible future events. Specifically, our 
memory of past experiences provides events out of which possible 
future scenarios are constructed. This hypothesis is supported by 
clinical research showing that memory impairment compromises 
patients’ ability to imagine future scenarios, and by neuroimaging 
research pointing to a Core Brain System that is activated while 
remembering the past and imagining the future. Marshall’s descrip-
tion of !Kung conversation patterns provides a striking behavioral 
illustration of the connection between remembering and planning 
in daily life: “The men’s imaginations turn to hunting. They con-
verse musingly, as though enjoying a sort of daydream together, 
they saw during the day and where they fit into the kinship system. 
Often, one girl will have information that corrects or supports 
another’s account. The stories may explain why a member of the 
community is known by a particular nickname, to which family a 
woman belonged before her marriage, or how certain people are 
related to others. The stories are a means by which the girls can 
work together to construct the kinship system of the community” 
(de Marrais et al., 1994, p. 202). Participants in de Marrais et al.’s 
(1994) study ranged in age from 9 to 12, but it is not known when 
children acquire a comprehensive map of their social world.
Another key foraging knowledge set is information about dan-
gerous animals and how to avoid them. Evidence suggests that at 
least some of the cognitive mechanisms that scaffold this task begin 
emerging early in development. For example, humans appear to 
have evolved intuitive ontologies (Spelke et al., 1992; Wellman and 
Gelman, 1992; Carey, 2009) – cognitive structures that categorize 
entities in the world by the properties they have in common. These 
ontological categories are invaluable for making valid inferences. 
For example, putting jaguar in the “agent” category activates the 
inferences “eats,” “periodically experiences hunger” and “is capable 
of goal-directed action,” which have obvious fitness benefits for 
the individual making them. A number of studies suggest that the 
agency system contains intentional schemas – inference systems 
activated under specific conditions – which are used to predict the 
behavior of agents (Gergely et al., 1995; Csibra et al., 1999), includ-
ing animal predators (Csibra et al., 2003; Barrett, 2005).
However, finer-grained predictions of animal behavior require 
knowledge acquisition as well as inference (Barrett, 2005). Boyer’s 
(2001) “template” model of knowledge acquisition illustrates the 
interdependence of conceptual primitives (e.g., innate ontologi-
cal categories) and environmental input (e.g., learning). Boyer 
proposes that the acquisition of knowledge about entities in the 
world is guided by cognitive structures – templates – that specify 
the general attributes of the category to which that entity belongs 
(e.g., person, animal, natural object, tool). Thus, the animal 
template specifies the general attributes of animal agents (e.g., eats, 
reproduces, occupies a specific habitat), and the particulars of a 
given species’ attributes are fleshed out as relevant information 
becomes available over the individual’s lifespan. Initially, a child 
may only know a species’ name – e.g., “jaguar.” Then, as additional 
information is acquired, it is plugged into the appropriate slot. For 
example, the information that jaguars attack and eat humans would 
be added to the slot for “diet.” Thus, while ontological categories 
and at least some intentional schemas (Gergely et al., 1995; Csibra 
et al., 1999, 2003) emerge early and reliably in development, full 
assembly and calibration of these systems requires informational 
inputs from the local environment. The age by which this occurs 
is unknown. Nor do we know the degree to which information 
inputs are provided through verbal transmission. Answers to these 
questions are critical to determining when learning is complete.
A third critical foraging knowledge set is wayfinding informa-
tion. Navigation is integral to nearly every facet of forager life: 
locating food, water, and shelter; avoiding predators, danger-
ous conspecifics, and inanimate hazards; and mate acquisition 
(Silverman and Choi, 2005). This raises the question: at what age is 
this capacity sufficiently developed for an individual to cognitively 
map the distribution of resources and hazards across the landscape 
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typically includes “one or more persons [characters] from whose 
perspective we can vicariously experience the receipt of informa-
tion” (Tooby and Cosmides, 2001, p. 24). Thus, depending on the 
narrative point of view, we experience story events not only from 
our own perspective but (potentially) from the perspectives of oth-
ers. In other words, the “experience” contributed by narrative to 
episodic memory includes ego’s observation of events as well as 
ego’s observation of characters’ observations of events. Through 
storytelling, then, parents can safely, efficiently, and exponentially 
expand their children’s life experience and episodic memory, 
thereby enabling them to construct a wider range of alternative 
perspectives and scenarios. In life history terms, storytelling is a 
means by which parents can invest in the embodied capital of their 
offspring: narrative is a format par excellence by which the brain can 
“transform present experiences into future performance” (Kaplan 
and Gangestad, 2005, p. 74).
the Facts about FIctIon
The claim that participating in story worlds expands personal expe-
rience may appear to be undermined by the fictional nature of 
much story content. How is an individual to distinguish between 
factual and counterfactual content and thereby avoid the pitfalls of 
acting on false information? (This problem applies to non-fiction 
narrative as well, because even “true” stories are subject to inaccu-
rate recall and exaggeration.) The surprising answer is that, in many 
cases, fictional content is benign with respect to fitness. Consider 
the Netsilingmiut story in which a moose tricks a hunter into let-
ting it escape. The moose has been ambushed in deep water by 
a man in a kayak. Realizing his peril, the moose says to the man, 
“Just let me get near to the bright shallow water over there, then 
you may stab me” (Rasmussen, 1931, p. 399). The man complies 
with the moose’s request, and once the animal gets to the shallow 
water, it runs away. On a subsequent hunt, the man encounters the 
same moose, which attempts the same trick. This time, however, 
the man ignores the moose and kills it before it can reach the shal-
low water. The obvious factual information contained in this story 
is the observation that moose are harder to kill in shallow water 
than in deep water, and the obvious counterfactual information is 
that moose can talk. Interestingly, the counterfactual information 
is neutral with respect to the factual information: it is true that 
moose are more likely to elude a hunter in shallow water than in 
deep water regardless of whether they are capable of speech. Thus, 
the story provides information useful for predicting the behavior 
of a valuable prey species, and believing that moose can talk does 
not compromise this information or impose additional costs on 
the acquisition of this resource.
This observation notwithstanding, humans regularly and reli-
ably filter the factual from the fictional. This stems from our ability 
to represent and store information as “contingently true” – infor-
mation that might be true, used to be true, might be true in the 
future, is true in some places but not others, is true according to 
some people, or is true under certain circumstances (Leslie, 1987; 
Cosmides and Tooby, 2000). This capacity scaffolds a host of cog-
nitive operations, including planning: both fictions and plans are 
counterfactual scenarios. The ability to reason counterfactually 
enables humans to exploit universes of information unavailable 
to other species, but it also presents a formidable adaptive problem: 
about past hunts, telling over and over where game was found and 
who killed it. They wonder where the game is at present, and say 
what fat bucks they hope to kill. They also plan their next hunts 
with practicality” (1976, p. 352). The men’s discussion slips seam-
lessly from episodic memory (where game was found) to possible 
scenarios (where game is at present) to possible future scenarios 
(fat bucks they hope to kill).
If past experience provides the raw material for construct-
ing future scenarios, then increases in experience should lead to 
increases in the range of future scenarios one is able to imagine, as 
well as improvements in their detail and accuracy. Unfortunately, 
acquiring experience at first hand can be difficult, time-consuming, 
and/or dangerous. Animal knowledge is a case in point: how do 
young children learn the salient characteristics of different animal 
species, their behavior patterns, and the habitats with which they 
are associated? Some information might be acquired by observing 
game brought back to camp. However, this method depends on the 
child seeing the game before it is butchered, and is confounded 
by the common practice of butchering large game at the kill site 
and carrying it back to camp piecemeal. Unweaned children, who 
typically accompany their mothers on gathering forays (Berndt 
and Berndt, 1964, p. 133; Goodale, 1971, p. 35; Marshall, 1976; 
Hames, 1988; Konner, 2005, p. 53; Marlowe, 2010), may have the 
opportunity to observe animals both en route to/from and at the 
foraging patch. However, research shows that children’s attention 
at this age is narrow in scope: infants and toddlers overwhelmingly 
attend to and manipulate small objects close at hand (Garvey, 1990; 
Chase, 1992) and play within 200 feet of their caregivers (Anderson, 
1972; Draper, 1976; Konner, 1976; Hurtado et al., 1992; Hill and 
Hurtado, 1996). This preference is not due to poor visual acu-
ity, which reaches 20/20 by age 2 (Heerwagen and Orians, 2002). 
Weaned children, on the other hand, are typically left in camp 
while parents forage. The likelihood of seeing animals in camp is 
low (Heerwagen and Orians, 2002), as is the range of animal spe-
cies likely to be observed. Thus, young children’s opportunities 
for observing animal behavior are limited and – due to their small 
size and lack of experience – fraught with risk (Scalise Sugiyama, 
2001a; Barrett, 2005).
Information exchange offers a proactive, safe, readily available 
solution to this problem by enabling children to acquire informa-
tion about a given experience in the absence of the actual experience 
and before the information is actually needed (Scalise Sugiyama, 
2001a). This practice is maintained in modern environments, in 
which children are exposed to animal behavior under highly con-
trolled, low-risk circumstances, such as picture books, television, 
and zoos. Narrative is particularly well-suited to the expansion of 
experience because it simulates the human environment – agents, 
actions, and environmental constraints on action (including other 
agents) – enabling individuals to “watch” the goals and actions of 
a given set of agents play out under a given set of circumstances 
(Scalise Sugiyama, 2005). Because narrative “mimics the format 
in which experienced events are mentally represented and stored 
in memory” (Tooby and Cosmides, 2001, p. 24), stories enable us 
to make the experiences of others our own, and add them to our 
episodic memory. Furthermore – with all due respect to the pow-
ers of the mindreading system – in narrative we are truly privy to 
what others perceive, think, feel, intend, and desire, in that a story 
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 monkeys, armadillos, tapirs, giant anteaters, and jaguars…. They 
were Yanomam, and turned into animals” (Wilbert and Simoneau, 
1990, p. 285). The metamorphosis of the ancestors is safely rel-
egated to a distant past, and does not interfere with present-day 
Ya˛nomamö consumption practices.
The experiences made available by narrative are by no means 
limited to observations of animal behavior. Oral traditions contain 
information relevant to the full spectrum of daily tasks with which 
the forager is presented, including locating and harvesting food, 
resource processing, shelter construction, route finding, campsite 
selection, avoiding inanimate hazards, and navigating the social 
world. For example, Yup’ik stories transmit information about 
cultural norms, gender roles, subsistence strategies, and kinship 
(de Marrais et al., 1994). Dena stories “instruct, not only describ-
ing the characteristics of animals and birds of which the Dena 
should take note, but teaching the difference between right and 
wrong conduct” (de Laguna, 1995, p. 290). To illustrate the range 
of information stored and transmitted via narrative, the remainder 
of this section offers an overview of representative cross-cultural 
patterns in oral narrative content vis-à-vis recurrent information 
demands of foraging life.
cross-cultural patterns In oral narratIve content
Cultural anthropologists frequently observe that forager myths and 
folktales are a rich source of subsistence information. For example, 
Berndt and Yunupingu (1979) note that, even though the Arnhem 
Land coast is rich in food resources, “the people who lived there 
had to work hard to collect or catch their food. The stories helped 
to keep all of this information together because they tell where to 
find different kinds of food and how to prepare them for eating” 
(10). Similarly, Yup’ik stories describe how to pick berries and how 
to cut, dry, and smoke fish – indeed, “vegetation, the weather, the 
river, local animals, etc., were all integral parts of daily life stories” 
(de Marrais et al., 1994, p. 205; see also Opler, 1938; Ridington, 1988; 
Biesele, 1993; de Laguna, 1995). A Karok story about the theft of 
fire illustrates storytelling’s richness as vector of subsistence-related 
information. In this story, Coyote steals fire from the Yellow Jackets, 
who pursue him angrily. The fire is handed off to a succession of 
animals, finally coming to Frog:
Now the Yellow Jackets had nearly caught up, when Frog was there 
with his mouth open. He took the fire in his mouth, made one jump, 
and was in the river. The Yellow Jackets could not see him. So they 
went home. Frog emerged and saw alders and willows growing there 
above him. He spat the fire out into the willow roots: then there 
was just a little smoke.
There are only two trees that make fire well, willow at the river and 
cedar on the mountains….it was Buzzard who made fire on the 
hill….he had made it with cedar bark rubbed fine. He blew hard 
on the tinder, [and] it blazed up. (Kroeber and Gifford, 1980, p. 12)
This short passage contains information about an important 
resource, an ecological hazard, and animal behavior, characteristics, 
and habitat. The resource information includes types of wood suit-
able for making fire, where to find them, and how to use them (light 
the roots of willow, rub cedar bark fine, blow hard on the tinder to 
the danger that contingently true information will get stored as true 
information and acted upon as such. Thus, use of contingently true 
information requires what Lewis (1978, p. 37) presciently called an 
“intensional operator” (e.g., “in story x”) and what Cosmides and 
Tooby call “scope syntax” (2000). In order to prevent co-mingling 
of true and contingently true information, they argue, the latter 
must be “decoupled” from the former – i.e., marked with tags that 
delineate the scope of conditions under which it is true. Fictions are 
sets of contingently true propositions – counterfactual scenarios – 
that enable us to visualize and evaluate the possible consequences of 
possible courses of action. Extracting information from counterfac-
tual scenarios that is applicable in real-world situations requires the 
identification of similarities between the counterfactual scenario 
and a real-world task. That is, the mind must be able to decouple 
irrelevant from relevant information. For example, “one can learn 
from Cordelia that overt emotional demonstrativeness is not a reli-
able cue to devotedness… but the reader should discard the specifics 
as irrelevant, rather than concluding that being named ‘Cordelia’ is 
a reliable cue to devotedness” (Tooby and Cosmides, 2001, p. 22).
Thus, foragers may tell stories about animals that talk or jug-
gle their eyes or have sex with their mother-in-law, but they don’t 
behave as if animals in the real world do these things. As Barrett 
(2005) observes, a Koyukon hunter may believe that if he treats 
the deer he has killed with respect and gratitude, it will be reborn 
for him to kill another day, but the many inferences that follow 
from this assumption are belied by the hunter’s behavior: “if the 
deer were actually willingly sacrificing itself to the hunter, it would 
be unnecessary to pursue it, [and] there would be no need for 
the hunter to conceal himself when approaching the deer” (458). 
Blurton Jones and Konner’s (1976) assessment of !Kung counter-
factual beliefs about animals applies across the forager spectrum: 
such beliefs “play a small role in day-to-day !Kung life and in their 
interactions with animals…. [and] do not interfere with the study 
of animal behavior. They seem to exist in a domain of the mind 
quite separate from ethno-ethological knowledge” (344). Indeed, 
many forager oral traditions make a clear distinction between 
stories of the recent and distant past (Lowie, 1918; Radin, 1956; 
Jacobs, 1959; Biesele, 1976; Sobel and Bettles, 2000). The latter take 
place during an indeterminate, ancient time when “the animals 
were like people” (Erdoes and Ortiz, 1998, p. 12), in a world where 
“the animals or birds have but to take off their skin to become 
human” (Parsons, 1929, p. 5) or humans are capable of “turning 
into animals when they get into situations in which they need the 
animal’s characteristics” (Blurton Jones and Konner, 1976, p. 343). 
For example, the Winnebago divided their prose narratives into 
waikan (what-is-sacred) and worak (what-is-recounted). Waikan 
referred to an irretrievable past in which events occurred that are 
no longer humanly possible, whereas worak dealt with ordinary, 
present-day events and conditions (Radin, 1956, p. 118). Similarly, 
the Koyukuk tell stories set in “Myth Time” – a period “so remote 
that its realities are not those of today, and are not to be believed 
or judged in the ordinary terms of the present. That was when all 
Animals were Men, with the power of human speech” (1995, p. 
76). A Ya˛nomamö origin story illustrates this distinction: “All the 
ancestors kept turning into animals, and those ancestors are here 
now! Today we eat those ancestors from the early times, when 
we Yanomam did not exist! They are animals: toucans, spider 
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 parents when moving camp) or through information exchange. 
Significantly, a recurrent theme in forager folklore is the origin 
of local topographical features (Scalise Sugiyama and Sugiyama, 
2008). The Dreamtime is perhaps the best known instance of this 
phenomenon. These myths recount the adventures of ancestral 
beings who created present-day features of the Australian land-
scape as they traveled across the country. Collectively, these stories 
form a map of the territory utilized by the group, giving members 
a sense of the locations of important sites relative to one another 
(Tonkinson, 1978). This theme occurs widely across forager cultures 
and habitats – from the Western Desert to the Pacific Northwest, 
from Amazonia to the Great Plains, from Patagonia to the Arctic 
(Scalise Sugiyama and Sugiyama, 2008). For example, in Dena folk-
lore, “Some places are associated with the Traveler’s adventures. 
Thus, a hole in the rock somewhere below Rampart is where he 
anchored his canoe when searching for the noise in the woods; 
and his tracks are there, too” (de Laguna, 1995, p. 302). In a Karok 
story, Hakananap-manan makes the “upriver ocean” Kayurash, 
then decides to travel downriver: “When he came to where it flows 
through the rocky ridge Keichivikyuripa at Hayward’s Bar, he left 
the river. He did not want to go further that way but widened the 
rocky chasm and went up the ridge on the mountains to the right, 
to Sihaviitka, where all the ridges meet and the streams flow down 
in 10 directions” (Kroeber and Gifford, 1980, p. 49). Without ever 
having seen these places, a Karok child could learn from this story 
that there is a large body of water upriver, that its outlet is navigable 
and passes through a rocky chasm just past a bar, this chasm is at 
the base of a mountain ridge, this ridge is traversable, this ridge 
intersects with several other ridges, and at this intersection there 
are streams flowing in many different directions.
The forager oral tradition also references inanimate hazards, 
such as inclement weather and natural disasters. For example, 
“Floods have apparently killed enough Ache in the distant past 
that they figure importantly in Ache mythology” (Hill and Hurtado, 
1996, p. 152). The Selknam tell of a woman who was gathering fish 
along the beach “when she perceived a dull noise, which sounded as 
though the earth were rumbling. It was still far off in the distance, 
but kept coming closer” (Gusinde, 1975, p. 71). She summons her 
parents, who hear the loud roar of the waves and tell her that bad 
weather is on the way: “That is how it always is. When very bad 
weather approaches, one can first hear a dull, heavy rolling far in 
the distance and feel the earth trembling. And so those people 
said: ‘Now bad weather will come and much snow will fall!’ All 
prepared themselves. Such bad weather always comes from the east 
(or the southeast)” (Gusinde, 1975, p. 72). In a footnote, Gusinde 
confirms the truth of the weather information conveyed in this 
story: “bad storms almost always come from the east or south-
east and announce their arrival with a loud roar. When heavy rain 
approaches, the splashing of the big drops from far away gives 
the impression of a dull murmuring. The same happens when a 
snowstorm lightly ripples the waves and pushes them ahead of 
itself” (Gusinde, 1975, p. 72).
Because forager life involves extensive intraspecific coopera-
tion and competition, exploitation of this niche requires complex 
manipulations of the social as well as the physical environment. 
Tellingly, forager oral tradition is rife with information about 
human behavior – deception (Scalise Sugiyama, 2008), incest 
get the fire started). The hazard referenced is the yellow jacket, and 
information is provided regarding its behavior (fleet, aggressive, 
relentless pursuit when disturbed) and how to elude it (jump in 
river). By making yellow jackets the possessors of fire, the story also 
metaphorically references one of this animal’s most salient char-
acteristics: its painful sting, which burns like fire. Finally, the story 
references frog and buzzard habitat (river and hill, respectively).
Oral traditions also provide information useful to surviving 
periods of famine (Scalise Sugiyama and Sugiyama, 2009). For 
example, the Bella Coola tell how 1 year “it failed to become warm 
in April; the berries flowered, but the constant cold wind prevented 
their fruit from ripening. Few fish entered the river, and even they 
could not be caught because the water remained so clear. The same 
conditions prevailed for 4 years until the people were starving” 
(McIlwraith, 1948, p. 500). This passage provides information 
regarding the time of year when famine set in, the length of the 
famine period, and the resources that failed. The story goes on to 
identify other resources that fail, and foods that can be eaten in their 
stead: “Even the clams and mussels were dead, so that fern-roots 
and trout were the only dependable foods…. At this time there 
was living at Nuxwlst an unmarried woman with a child, who like 
everyone else, was starving. She used to support herself by hunting 
eels on the beach” (501). Finally, the story identifies environmental 
cues that can be used to locate foods that are not normally exploited: 
“One morning she saw a number of gulls feeding on something, 
and, driving them off, she found that it was a stranded porpoise. 
The woman returned for her basket and knife, cut up the food, and 
took it home” (501).
Although it is a within-culture study, Sobel and Bettles’ (2000) 
analysis of Klamath and Modoc myth provides quantitative evi-
dence that oral tradition contains information about subsistence 
stress. Based on ethnographic and historical records of famine 
among the closely related Klamath and Modoc tribes, the authors 
predicted that these groups’ mythology would contain information 
relevant to coping with this problem. After surveying the entire 
corpus of Klamath and Modoc myths, the authors selected all that 
explicitly or implicitly referenced subsistence stress (n = 34). They 
then compiled a list of themes related to subsistence stress (divided 
into five categories: subsistence stress, causes of subsistence stress, 
coping strategies, social exchange alliances, and shared access to 
harvest sites) and recorded the presence/absence of each theme for 
each myth in the sample. Their prediction was upheld for all theme 
categories. For example, 56% of myths referenced environmental 
and 88% referenced social causes of subsistence stress. All 34 myths 
referenced exchange as a means of coping with subsistence risk, 
while 35% referenced storage (preserving and stockpiling food for 
winter) and 18% referenced diversification (use of resources not 
normally exploited). The presence in oral tradition of information 
relevant to subsistence and subsistence stress is consistent with 
claims that linguistic communication increases foraging efficiency 
(e.g., Hames, 1990; Kaplan and Hill, 1992; Buckley and Steele, 2002) 
and may increase offspring survival rates (Fitch, 2004; Locke and 
Bogin, 2006).
As noted above, many foraging tasks involve wayfinding, and 
navigation using landmarks and dead reckoning both require local 
information inputs. Topographical information can be acquired 
through first-hand experience (e.g., as children follow their 
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indirectly that their behavior is out of bounds or to indicate the 
appropriate way to act” (Rogoff, 2003, p. 217). In some cultures, this 
practice is institutionalized in the form of the joking relationship. 
For example, among the King Island Eskimo, “Cross-cousins were 
supposed to tease each other, to make fun of each other when some-
body did something wrong…. Whenever someone misbehaved or 
did something foolish, someone would tell his cross-cousin about it 
and the cross-cousin would tease, make up jokes or songs to make 
the person feel funny” (Senungetuk and Tiulana, 1987, pp. 30–31). 
Teasing may also be used preemptively, as in the !Kung practice of 
“insulting the meat” to prevent hunters from becoming arrogant 
and domineering (Lee, 1984).
Like teasing, storytelling is a non-confrontational means of 
expressing disapproval: telling a pointed story in the presence of 
a person who has behaved inappropriately is a way of hinting that 
he/she needs to curtail this behavior. Stories can also be used pro-
actively: storytelling might discourage people from transgressing 
by showing what will happen to them if they do so. For exam-
ple, stories told by Yup’ik girls show what happens to people who 
engage in inappropriate behavior, such as marital infidelity or, in 
the case of children, staying out after dark (de Marrais et al., 1994, 
p. 201). Similarly, Dena “tales instruct because they illustrate the 
consequences of particular actions. Repetition of the tale helps 
the listener to ponder the lesson therein illustrated” (de Laguna, 
1995, pp. 75–76).
One of the most compelling lines of evidence that storytelling 
is used to broadcast and enforce cultural norms is the ubiquity 
and popularity of the trickster figure. Boehm (1999) identifies 
five behaviors that are universally proscribed in egalitarian for-
ager societies: murder within the group, heavily self-interested 
verbal deception, theft, stinginess, and failure to cooperate. The 
trickster embodies all of these, and is widely viewed as an exam-
ple of bad behavior (Scalise Sugiyama, 2008). For example, “Crow 
(Raven) embodies all the vices and very few of the virtues stressed 
by the Indians, so that while they laughed at him, even the laziest 
and most greedy could recognize that he was not to be emulated” 
(de Laguna, 1995, p. 75). Likewise, “Coyote’s outrageous sexual 
antics, his thorough selfishness, his general irresponsibility in the 
stories allowed ‘good citizens’ of the tribe to affirm the system of 
norms and punishments that Coyote is forever comically running 
afoul of” (Ramsey, 1977, p. xxxi). As these observations illustrate, 
trickster stories are similar to teasing in that they use humor to sanc-
tion proscribed behavior. With stories, however, the sanctioning is 
more indirect: the behavior of the trickster, not a group member, 
is the object of ridicule. Significantly, the trickster’s behavior is 
often discovered, outmaneuvered, and/or punished (Boas, 1898, 
p. 7). In this way, without accusing anyone of a crime, the group 
can identify a proscribed behavior, express their disapproval of it, 
and show potential transgressors the treatment that awaits them 
if they misbehave.
Greed and selfishness are not the sole prerogative of the trickster. 
Stinginess and free riding are widespread themes in forager folklore 
and are universally condemned. This attitude no doubt arises from 
the fact that survival in the foraging niche depends on extensively 
on cooperation with others: given this circumstance, benefits will 
accrue to individuals who are able to curb selfishness and encour-
age generosity in others. The vigilance with which foragers patrol 
(Scalise Sugiyama, in preparation), infidelity, intrasexual compe-
tition, warfare (Scalise Sugiyama and Sugiyama, in preparation), 
disobedient children (Scalise Sugiyama and Sugiyama, in press), 
and other complications of social living. In some cases, stories sim-
ply present the consequences of the characters’ actions; in others, 
however, these actions are judged. Indeed, oral tradition is widely 
viewed as “a technique of moral education, in which models of 
socially appropriate behavior are presented to children with praise 
and models of inappropriate behavior are held up to ridicule” 
(Fischer, 1981, p. 740). For example, “Jicarilla mythology is truly 
the codification of the beliefs and mores of the group. There are 
few matters of conduct which the Jicarilla do not refer back to this 
body of lore. It is thought of as the proper guide to action, positive 
and negative” (Opler, 1938, p. viii). Storytelling serves to enforce 
cultural norms as well as model them. In West Africa, for example, 
proverbs and folktales are used to illustrate virtuous behaviors so 
that children can imitate them, and scary stories are used to discour-
age children from engaging in proscribed behaviors (Nsamenang, 
1992). For example, among the Jicarilla:
As a means for the control of conduct there is no measure more used 
or more successful than the telling of a myth. If a child is unruly at 
night, the story of the monster owl and his basket is enough to force 
quiet and obedience. Should a boy be seen playing with an older 
sister or a female cross-cousin, a few pointed stories of mishaps likely 
to follow such thoughtlessness make him more discreet. Should a 
youth, angered that he has been called from play to tend horses, 
treat one of the animals roughly, there is a story which will cause 
him to think well before again allowing his bad temper to master 
him. (Opler, 1938, p.  xii)
The claim that storytelling is used to enforce cultural norms is 
consonant with the observation that foragers use various forms of 
social sanctioning to curb antisocial behavior, ease social tensions, 
and prevent ill-will (Biesele, 1976; Boehm, 1993, 1999). One of the 
most common sanctioning tactics is criticism, which is effective 
because, in small-scale societies, people are highly sensitive to the 
disapproval of others. The indigenous tribes of Oregon are a case in 
point. In these groups, order was maintained “through a tradition 
of community approval and disapproval…. Instead of fearing a 
guilty conscience, a potential wrong-doer in an Indian community 
feared public exposure and shame above all” (Ramsey, 1977, p. 
xxxi). Similarly, the Dena “are very sensitive to what others may 
say…. the unwritten laws of the people are enforced through the 
strength of public opinion” (de Laguna, 1995, p. 76). Sometimes, 
disapproval is straightforward. In Jicarilla culture, for example, 
“Those who ‘give’ the stories to the children stand usually in a 
grandparental relationship to them and so it has become customary 
to chide aberrant conduct by inquiring scathingly of the transgres-
sor, ‘Did you have no grandparent to tell you the stories?’” (Opler, 
1938, p. xii). In other cases, criticism is indirect. Among the Dena, 
for example, “criticisms… are never directed to the person at fault. 
That would be too insulting. Instead, they are mentioned to a third 
party, but in such a way that the person for whom they are intended 
can hear them” (de Laguna, 1995, p. 314). Criticism can also be 
rendered less confrontational through the use of humor: “In some 
communities, teasing by adults or peers is a way to inform people 
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that stories should contain information that is difficult or danger-
ous to acquire at first hand – for example, information regarding 
environmental hazards (e.g., toxic substances, dangerous animals, 
getting lost, inclement weather). On this point, Bock and Johnson 
(2004) argue that play is an important means of learning when 
there are constraints on learning through first-hand experience. 
Conversely, because some skills (e.g., shooting an arrow, cracking 
nuts, weaving a basket) are best acquired through observation and 
practice, we would not expect stories to contain detailed explana-
tions of how do these things. However, we might expect them to 
contain information relevant to locating, selecting, and/or process-
ing materials used in these tasks.
To test the hypothesis that parents invest knowledge in their 
offspring via storytelling, the most critical and obvious data needed 
is information on who tells stories to whom. Although studies of 
daily life skill transmission sometimes include “non-practical” skills 
such as dance, pottery decoration, and bead making (Hewlett and 
Cavalli-Sforza, 1986; Shennan and Steele, 1999), they do not include 
storytelling. Anecdotal observations in the ethnographic and folk-
lore literature indicate that folklore and mythology are transmitted 
vertically, but the degree to which this transmission is from parent 
(or alloparent) to child is unknown.
Another important avenue of inquiry is the age at which chil-
dren become “accomplished naturalists.” If it is true that “the years 
between the five-to-seven shift and puberty are a human adapta-
tion for a large amount of cultural acquisition” (Konner, 2010, p. 
637), we would expect older children to be more knowledgeable 
than younger children. This could be tested by administering a 
questionnaire to different age groups to measure proficiency in 
various knowledge sets (e.g., animal behavior, spatial and tempo-
ral distribution of resources). Data could also be collected on the 
age at which children begin foraging for various resources, then 
compared with foraging knowledge data to see whether (and how 
much) knowledge acquisition occurs before children begin foraging 
on their own. These data would provide a basis for estimating how 
much knowledge is acquired through social learning. Finally, if it is 
true that stories are an important source of knowledge in forager 
cultures, then another knowledge set foragers must master is the 
oral tradition itself. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this knowl-
edge is not mastered until relatively late in life. Among the !Kung, 
for example, young and even middle-aged storytellers are rare, and 
it is “the addition of knowledge, not secret knowledge but a large 
collection of items which takes a long time to accumulate, which 
results in competent storytelling. It is generally the case that by the 
time a person is a zhu n!a (‘old person’) he will have accumulated 
a good deal of this knowledge” (Biesele, 1976, p. 308). Quantitative 
data on how many different stories each group member knows is 
lacking, but would not be prohibitively difficult to collect.
dIscussIon
In arguing that storytelling is a means of social learning, I am not 
arguing that storytelling is the only means of social learning. Rather, 
storytelling is one of several means by which humans invest in 
cognitive capital. Nor am I arguing that every information byte in 
a given story is useful information. Rather, my claim is that forager 
oral tradition includes information that is potentially useful in 
solving problems recurrently encountered in forager life. Whether 
this aspect of human life is seen in Klamath and Modoc myth: 
88% of the myths in the Sobel and Bettles (2000) sample identi-
fied stinginess as a cause of subsistence stress, and 100% identified 
sharing as a means of coping with it. These stories make explicit 
the benefits of cooperation and the hazards of non-cooperation: 
sharing leads to good fortune, while theft, greed and hoarding lead 
to bad. For example, high-status persons (e.g., shamans, chiefs, rich 
men) are portrayed as reciprocators, while non-reciprocators are 
often punished by supernatural agents.
In sum, forager oral traditions contain information relevant to 
meeting a wide range of challenges in forager life. It seems unlikely 
that this is an accident: if information exchange increases foraging 
efficiency, it stands to reason that it increases efficiency in other 
task domains. Indeed, the ability to faithfully transmit accumu-
lated knowledge across generations – the so-called ratchet effect 
(Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et al., 2005) – is increasingly seen 
as one of the most pivotal events in human evolution. The oral 
traditions of foraging peoples are both a product and a record of 
this capacity. As such, they constitute a vast, natural experiment: a 
cross-cultural record of the kinds of information people remember 
and share across generations in a foraging context.
testIng the hypothesIs
Testing the claim that engaging in storytelling develops skills and 
knowledge sets that are useful later in life is a difficult proposi-
tion. This is due to the universality of the behavior in question: if 
all humans are exposed to storytelling, how are we to determine 
whether exposure to storytelling enhances knowledge or whether 
humans do indeed draw on information contained in stories to 
solve real-world problems? An ideal test would involve a within-
culture comparison of performances on specific foraging tasks 
between two sets of individuals, one raised with storytelling and 
one raised without. For obvious ethical and practical reasons, such 
a test is untenable. However, a newspaper article about the tsunami 
of December 26, 2004 (Mason, 2005) suggests an alternative experi-
mental paradigm. According to the article, only 7 of the 75,000 
inhabitants of Simeulue island died, because the overwhelming 
majority remembered the stories their grandparents had told them 
about the “semong” (tsunami) of 1907 and fled to higher ground. 
As one informant reported, “After the earthquake, I looked for the 
water to suck out…. I remember the story of the ‘semong’ and I ran 
to the hill.” A test similar to this natural experiment can be envi-
sioned in which performance on a given task is compared between 
subjects who are told a story that contains information useful to 
performing the task and subjects given the equivalent information 
in non-narrative form (or who are told a story unrelated to the 
performance of the task). Neuroimaging provides another means of 
testing the hypothesis that storytelling is used to acquire informa-
tion instrumental to constructing future scenarios. Are the brain 
regions activated by planning tasks also activated during narra-
tive processing? Are the same brain regions activated by episodic 
memory tasks also activated during narrative processing?
We can also make predictions about cross-cultural patterns in 
story content. As the tsunami article suggests, we would expect sto-
ries to contain information about phenomena that occur at inter-
vals longer than the human lifespan (e.g., calamitous earthquakes/
tsunamis, severe droughts, 100-year floods). Another prediction is 
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a given piece of information proves to be useful will vary from indi-
vidual to individual, depending on his/her attributes, constraints, 
and the events that befall him/her.
If prolonged juvenility evolved, in part, to support learning, 
then humans may have been under selection to invest in cogni-
tive capital. A case in point is the enjoyment humans get out of 
listening to stories, which may be rooted in an evolved interest 
in acquiring information beyond what is immediately necessary. 
Such an interest has been documented for animal behavior: for 
example, !Kung men “sometimes observe animals more than is 
necessary for the purpose of the hunt in which they are involved” 
(Blurton Jones and Konner, 1976, pp. 337–338; see also Nelson, 
1969). This seemingly superfluous interest is hypothesized to be 
a risk-buffering strategy – a means of acquiring knowledge about 
animal behavior that might be useful in the future (Blurton Jones 
and Konner, 1976; Mithen, 1990). On this logic, we would expect 
humans to have an evolved interest in acquiring information use-
ful not only for hunting, but for gathering, wayfinding, mating, 
 parenting – in short, any evolutionarily recurrent task with inherent 
risks that can be buffered by knowledge. Humans may find stories 
interesting because they simulate the whole of human experience – 
human beings, their actions, and environmental constraints on 
those actions – and therefore present information concerning a 
variety of task domains.
As noted above, information exchange “and the effects of incom-
plete information are important issues particularly relevant to 
human foragers, who rely extensively on learning and communi-
cation to assess resource distribution, abundance, and profitabil-
ity” (Kaplan and Hill, 1992, p. 186). If information is so critical to 
success in the foraging niche, we would expect foragers to exhibit 
concern regarding its reliability. This appears to be the case. The 
!Kung, for example, distinguish between directly observed behav-
ior, behavior deduced from tracks, hearsay (behavior reported by 
another person), and behavior they think could happen, and are 
hesitant to accept as fact behavior they have not witnessed them-
selves (Blurton Jones and Konner, 1976). This attitude is widespread 
in oral cultures (Rogoff, 2003, p. 40), and is evinced in storytelling 
as well. For example,
Athabaskan languages allow, or rather necessitate, that the narrator 
indicate how they learned what they are telling: for example, there 
is a form that indicates that the statement is based on personal 
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